Abstract-A deeper understanding of the availability of Public Safety and Security (PSS) mobile networks and their service under different conditions offers decision makers guidelines on the level of investments required and the directions to take in order to decrease the risks identified. In the study, a risk assessment model for the existing PSS mobile service is implemented for both a dedicated TETRA PSS mobile network as well as for a commercial 2G/3G mobile network operating under the current risk conditions. The probabilistic risk assessment is carried out by constructing a Bayesian Network. According to the analysis, the availability of the dedicated Finnish PSS mobile service is 99.1%. Based on the risk assessment and sensitivity analysis conducted, the most effective elements for decreasing availability risks would be duplication of the transmission links, backup of the power supply and realtime mobile traffic monitoring. With the adjustment of these key control variables, the service availability can be improved up to the level of 99.9%. The investments needed to improve the availability of the PSS mobile service from 99.1 % to 99.9% are profitable only in highly populated areas. The calculated availability of the PSS mobile service based on a purely commercial network is 98.8%.The adoption of a Bayesian Network as a risk assessment method is demonstrated to be a useful way of documenting different expert knowledge as a common belief about the risks, their magnitudes and their effects upon a Finnish PSS mobile service.
INTRODUCTION
Society has set tough targets for Public Safety and Security (PSS) agencies to perform their duties -while at the same time these agencies are under mounting pressure to reduce operating costs necessary to provide public services. Based on [1] , vulnerabilities will be exposed at a faster rate due to open source based network end points. A budget to mitigate the risks within mobile networks is necessary, security management must be prioritized and mobile networks need a defensive strategy that ensures both service availability and protection from different kinds of attacks.
Traditionally, the PSS mobile service has been implemented using a dedicated, government-owned network, e.g. Europe often used TETRA (TErrestrial Trunked Radio) technology. The mission critical services these networks offer to PSS agencies -such as police and rescue organizations -are group call and narrowband mobile data communication. The existing commercial networks, 2G/3G networks are well capable of producing those functionalities. However, the commercial networks have shown poor reliability and availability during times of emergency in the past [2] , because the missing priority functionality allows ordinary mobile users to block the network. This has largely been the main reason why dedicated PSS networks have been necessary and should be built for PSS agencies.
In this paper the Service is defined as a mission critical group call and narrowband mobile data communication service, offered for PSS agencies irrespective of the enabled network, whether a dedicated or a commercial cellular network. The socioeconomic value that PSS organizations create for society -based on the utilization of the Service -is called Value in this study. The risks threatening the Service are, for instance, a break in power supply, an unsuccessful SW release update to the mobile network, internal and external human risk factors or exceptional emergency cases, which may overload the network. In this paper the Service is seen as unavailable, when a province-wide geographical area is lacking the Service or when that Service is significantly degraded. The Service Risk is defined as unavailability (= 1 -availability) of the Service during a time period. Similarly, the Value Risk is defined as a loss of a Value over a set time period.
The purpose of the study is to examine: a) technical availability of the Service; b) ways to decrease the Service Risk and; c) ways to decrease the Value Risk.
The risk assessment has been carried out both for the existing TETRA mobile Service and for Service utilizing the commercial 2G/3G network.
The remainder of the paper is structured into seven chapters as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the risk assessment methods; Chapter 3 describes the results from qualitative risk assessment; Chapter 4 describes the results from quantitative risk assessment; Chapter 5 discusses the risk management based on socioeconomic value; Chapter 6 discusses the sensitivity analysis results and; finally, Chapter 7 concludes this study.
II. METHODS FOR RISK ASSESSMENT
There are numerous methods and tools for risk assessment, starting from qualitative risk register management and profiling [3] [4] , to quantitative methods based on statistical models, e.g. [5] [6], VarianceCovariance, Monte Carlo Simulation and historical simulation are examples of such methods.
In qualitative risk assessment [7] [8], the key risks are first defined and then typically organized according to: 1) their profile; 2) risk likelihood and; 3) risk consequence. This is achieved by using a two-dimensional graph, and by sorting the risks based on their likelihoods and consequences into three categories: 1) act now; 2) analyze, prioritize, decide and; 3) accept, as is done in Fig. 2 .
The quantitative assessment gives more exact and measurable definitions than the qualitative assessment, which makes it possible to understand more fully the benefit resulting from the investments.
The risk can be expressed as [9] A risk profiling is utilized in the study to identify the key risk areas. In addition, the existence of the mutual information (on-off-level) between the profiled risk components is estimated by using a Bayesian Network. A quantitative risk assessment uses the constructed Bayesian Network structure, to which the marginal and conditional probabilities are defined. A Bayesian Network (BN), sometimes called a Bayes Believe Network (BBN), is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) where the nodes denote probabilistic variables and an arc (arrow) between the two nodes denotes the existence of a conditional probability between them. The conditional probabilities (CP) for each node Xi are defined as, e.g. [10] [11], (2) CP(Xi) = {Pi (Xi |pa(Xi))}, where {pa(Xi)} is the parent function
The joint probability of the whole DAG is
Thus BN has two parts, namely a visual structure (DAG), and a parameter part, i.e. conditional probabilities for each node in the graph. In a discrete situation, the conditional probabilities are defined as Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) . The BN model in the quantitative analysis is visualized as a DAG with joint probabilities for each node.
In the study, the BN structure and parameters are constructed manually based on the common belief of all participating experts without observational data other than the marginal probabilities of certain triggers and controllers.
A BN for a quantitative risk assessment is used in this study for four main reasons: 1) there are not much observational data available, but instead a lot of expert knowledge and opinions; 2) the available a priori data about triggers and controllers can be easily included and updated in the model; 3) even though the final risk models might be complex, the manual construction process can focus on one child at a time, thus simplifying the model construction phase and; 4) once ready, a BN can offer omni-directional reasoning capabilities, which enables flexible what-if analysis. Computationally, BNs have often been too complex in the past. These days, however, because of more powerful computers and the availability of many Bayesian Network capable modelling tools such as AgenaRisk and Bayesialab [12] [13] , this ensures that BNs offer also in practice interesting new ways for assessing the risks of PSS mobile networks. A skeleton of a risk BN [14] , used for PSS mobile Service Risk assessment in this study, is shown in Fig. 1 . It consists of five types of nodes and their causal relationships. The risk sources (triggers in the skeleton BN) for the Service were identified and the probabilities defined by using a former study carried out by Suomen Erillisverkot (Table I) , subject matter experts (authors of this study; reference [15] ) as well as by using a risk profiling method. Similarly, risk mitigation possibilities (controls in the skeleton BN) and their current status in Finnish networks were identified based on the opinions of the experts in this field.
Events are intermediate consequences, contributing to the final consequence. The final consequence can still be mitigated using mitigants, defined also by the experts.
Normalized Mutual Information is used to compare the effect of different factors, such as the triggers, controls and events on the availability of the PSS mobile network. Mutual information is expressed in terms of entropies in the following way [16] :
where H(X) is the marginal entropy of the availability of the Service and H(X|Y) is the entropy of the availability given the knowledge of either triggers, controls or events.
III. QUALITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR PSS MOBILE SERVICE
The starting point of the key risks (triggers in the BN) is the internal report of Suomen Erillisverkot (Table I : [18] ). For a qualitative risk assessment, the key risks are in this study reviewed and organized according to their probability and consequences, see 
IV. QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR PSS MOBILE SERVICE

A. Construction of Quantitative Risk Assessment Model
National Public Safety Telecommunications Council (NPSTC) defines the target for Land Mobile Radio (LMR) service availability as a 99.999% probability of service availability for a local geographical area [19] . On the other hand, NPSTC defines the targets for a single nationwide network to a reliability level of 98% per year for any type of failure. In this definition any individual component level failure is counted as down time. For the Finnish PSS mobile network, which is covering the whole sparselypopulated country, the achievable and feasible service availability target could be 99.9% (8.8 hours total downtime per year), as can be seen in section VI A.
The marginal probabilities for triggers and controls are formed based on the expert opinions and on the current situation in Finland [15] . The results are shown in Table II , which represents the dedicated trigger-, control-, eventand mitigant variables as well as their costs in a dedicated network case. The characteristics of each trigger and control variable for the BN are described also in Table II . The marginal probabilities have been added to the BN in Fig. 5 using the values in Table II and by using the methods outlined above in Chapter 2. The CPTs for events, mitigants and consequences are constructed manually based on the interviews [15] and on the assumed behaviour of the triggers and controls. Readers are referred to the two example CPTs presented in Fig. 4 . For the sake of simplicity, the controls are expected to have a linear effect (in accordance with their probability existence) on the events. In the manual construction of the CPTs, the effect of latent variables have been also taken into account. This means, that the parent variables in the constructed BN do not always contribute 100% to the child, but below it, and, moreover, some unknown and unconstructed latent variables slightly affect the availability figures of the system as well. These latent variables can represent phenomena such as lack of fuel in the aggregate, HW failure at the precise moment when the control should 
B. Risk Assessment Model for Service Enabled by Dedicated Network
The likelihoods of the availability of the Service have been calculated for the dedicated network in Fig. 5 . The Bayesian Network shown in Fig. 5 describes, in fact, quantitatively the same risk situation as described qualitatively in Fig 3. The BN model has been constructed using the AgenaRisk-tool. The effects of the CPTs are visible in this model as joint probabilities for each state per variable. For simplicity, each model variable has only two states, i.e. either True or False, as can be seen from Fig. 5 . Based on the model in Fig. 5 , the availability of the Service (i.e. Unavailability of PSS network = False) in a dedicated network case is 99.1% (79 hours total downtime per year). If a commercial network is used as a back-up for the PSS network, then the availability will be 99.5% (44 hours total downtime per year).
As a reference the number of reported PSS Service breaks has been four per year in Finland in such cases, where the size of the affected area corresponds to the area of at least 40 base stations representing the area of the province [13] . The Service break downtime in these cases has been about 24 hours, giving a total annual break downtime of 96 hours in a year. This corresponds to a value of 98.9% Service availability. The PSS network operator in Belgium, ASTRID [20] , reported that the availability of their network has been between 99.97…99.99% during last four years. Based on these numbers, the constructed risk model describes well the behaviour of the current Finnish PSS network.
C. Risk Assessment Model for Service Enabled by Commercial Network
The likelihoods of the availability of the Service are calculated also for the commercial network using the Bayesian Network. The following assumptions are made concerning the differences between the commercial and the dedicated network cases: 1) Aggregates used in 1.4% of base stations (in the dedicated case 14.8%); Based on the model, the availability of Service for the commercial network case is currently 98.8% (representing a total of 105 hours downtime per year). The availability of Service of the dedicated network, on the other hand, was 99.1%, or a total of 79 hours downtime annually. If other commercial networks are working as a back-up for the prime commercial network, then the availability will be better, 99.3% equating to 61 hours of total downtime per year. By way of comparison, the availability of Service of the dedicated network was 99.5%, equating to 44 hours of total downtime, when a commercial network is used as a back-up.
V. RISK MANAGEMENT WITH SOCIOECONOMIC VALUE
A. Estimation of Monetary Value of Service
The Value is estimated in this study based on the socioeconomic value of the broadband PSS mobile network. In UK, Grous [21] has estimated the socioeconomic Value of the utilization of a new broadband mobile service by PSS agencies, as shown in Fig. 6 rural areas, where the base station network is built based on the coverage needs. In urban areas, however, where the number of base stations is based on the required capacity needs, the investments for additional aggregates and duplicating links would be more beneficial for the dedicated network solutions than for the commercial solutions.
VI. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR MODEL VARIABLES
A. Strength of Controls
Normalized Mutual Information (NMI) -between triggers and unavailability of Service -was calculated by using a Bayesialab-tool [13] in order to understand how strong the causal relationship (directly and indirectly) is between the triggers and the availability of the Service in the constructed BN model. Based on these calculations, Natural Disaster (NMI = 11.5%), Cyber Attack (NMI = 10.4%) and Bad operations by own personnel (NMI = 5.8%) have the strongest effect on Service availability, whereas NMI for the rest of triggers lie between 1.5% and 0.01%.
As it is not possible for humans to control many of the triggers (such as natural disaster), the focus for improving the availability of the Service lies in the controls (Fig. 1 ) themselves. The relationship between the controls and availability was studied graphically, by constructing an impact of changes in the control variables' means on the mean of the availability of the Service, see Fig. 7 . As can be seen, due to the binary variables, the relationship is linear. Controls such as Duplicated Links, Aggregates, Real-time traffic monitoring and N plus 1 have the highest slope, i.e. changes in their values mostly influence the availability value. However, the default value of N plus 1 was already set at 99%, so it has no additional effect on the availability figure. From Fig. 7 we can conclude that the availability can be improved by using different control values compared to the current situation. If all controls are given a value of 99.99%, then the best possible availability using this model can be achieved, anticipating that the trigger values are fixed. By doing things this way, the achieved theoretical availability of the Service would be 99.85%. Adjusting all control values to 99.99% is clearly not economically feasible; therefore, an availability target of 99.8% (18 hours annual non-availability) for the Service is in our opinion reasonable in the Finnish environment taking into account the long distances effecting delays in fault-fixing times. Based on Fig. 7 , those controls that are able to most effectively improve the availability of the Service are Duplicated Links, Aggregates and Real-time traffic monitoring. That objective (99.8%) -a practical maximum -can be achieved by selecting 92% completion within all three most effective controls: 1) Aggregates implemented in 92% of base stations (compared to the current situation of 15% in the model), 2) Duplicated Links existing in 92% of base stations (compared to the current situation of 1.5% duplicated) and 3) Real-time traffic monitoring covering 92% of traffic compared to the current value of 5%. By using the commercial network as a back-up, the availability of the Service can be improved from 99.8% to 99.9%.
B. Behaviour of PSS Networks in Case Risks Will Materialize
We used the constructed model and Bayesialab-tool [12] also to analyze the tolerance of the PSS network against the triggers, in case they will materialize. For that the triggers were set up one at a time to True while keeping the rest of the triggers as False. At the same time, the controls dedicated to control certain triggers were changed from False to True while keeping the rest of the controls as False. As an example, Natural Disaster was set to True while the remaining triggers were set to False and Figure 7 . The capability of controls to reduce the effect of triggers on the availability of the Service, when controls are changed from 0 (no controls) to 100 (all possible controls), one at a time while the remaining triggers were set to False and then based on the model, the variables Aggregate, Duplicated links and N plus 1 were changed from False (no controls used) to True (all possible controls used), one at a time. The results from the dedicated PSS network case have been ordered in Fig. 8 from the most serious scenario (top) to the least serious scenario (bottom), with the criteria being the availability of the Service. The left end of the bar denotes the control value False and the right end of the bar the value True. Thus for example, Real-time traffic monitoring is the best method to control Sabotage, but Sabotage can be managed within the available controls only up to an availability level of 46.5%. Fig. 8 also demonstrates that, without available controls, Serious disturbances (in switching or O&M centre), as the name indicates, is the most serious trigger for the PSS network. The conclusion from Fig. 8 is that the most serious scenarios (= triggers) are Sabotage and Cyber Attack because the effect of the controls on them are weaker than in the other scenarios. As can be seen from Fig. 8 , the availability in those cases stays under 50%.
Similar analysis was also made for the commercial PSS network. The conclusion from that analysis is that the behaviour of the model resembles the dedicated PSS network, but the commercial network lacks controls for the triggers Misuse of Network and Exceptional emergency and, therefore, the availability is under 25%, if those triggers will materialize.
C. Comparison of Dedicated and Commercially-based PSS Networks
When comparing the dedicated and purely commercial PSS networks based on the results in this and earlier chapters, we can conclude the following main points: • Exceptional emergency cases tend to block the commercial networks (high traffic load) • A commercial network is more sensitive to cyber attacks due to the higher number of IP-network accesses • Commercial networks have better network performance monitoring, which shortens potentially the breakdown time • In urban areas the number of base stations is higher in the commercial networks; this does not lower the availability value, but instead is a cost factor in case the availability of the base stations needs to be improved. The main difference between the two network types is the tolerance of the network towards some scenarios such as Misuse of Network and Exceptional emergency triggers, in case they will materialize. The commercial network does not have the control of the Dedicated network, and as can be seen in Fig. 8 , therefore the availability can drop to as low as 25%. This is the key reason why the public safety and security agencies insist on building dedicated networks for their own exclusive use.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In the study, a risk assessment model has been developed for the existing PSS mobile service, whether it is implemented using the dedicated TETRA PSS mobile network or the commercial 2G/3G mobile network. This paper studied the current risks expressed as unavailability and the risk mitigation possibilities for the Service when the risk is understood as a lack of Service availability in a province-wide geographical area. The use of a Bayesian Network as a risk assessment method is shown to be a useful way of documenting expert knowledge as a common belief regarding the current risks and their magnitudes and their effects upon a Service. Additional benefits arose from the use of a Bayesian Network for reasoning, such as what-if analysis and sensitivity analysis.
The main triggers contributing to the risks threatening Service availability are Natural Disaster, Cyber Attack and Bad operation by own employees.
According to the analysis, the availability of the Service, based on the dedicated network, is 99.1%. This figure represents respectively 79 hours of total Service downtime per year.
The total actual Service downtime in the Service today is about 96 hours in a year; this corresponds to 98.9% availability, which is close to the 99.1% result obtained from the risk model.
The availability value, given by the model for the purely commercial network is 98.8%, corresponding to 105 hours of total Service downtime.
The availability improvement analysis has been made for the dedicated network by changing the values of the most effective controls in order to find a practical maximum for the availability. The practical maximum of 99.8% availability (corresponding to 18 hours of Service downtime annually) was achieved by selecting 92% completion within all three most effective controls: 1) 92% Aggregates working as power backups (originally 15%); 2) 92% Duplicated Links (originally 1.5%) and; 3) 92% Realtime traffic monitoring (originally 5%).
With the improved Service availability of 99.8%, the annual Value Risk would decrease by 1.75…7.0M€ depending on the estimated size of the Value.
We used the constructed model to analyze the tolerance of the PSS network towards any modelled scenarios (= triggers), in case they will materialize. The conclusion was that the most serious scenarios are Sabotage and Cyber Attack because the effect of the controls on them are weaker than on the other scenarios. In addition to that, the PSS mobile networks based on the commercial networks do not tolerate the scenarios of Misuse of Network and Exceptional emergency -in those cases the Service availability may even drop below 25%.
The BN risk model is a simplification of real life. For example, in sensitivity analysis we did not analyze simultaneous "risk will materialize" scenarios. Also we kept the number of triggers as well as the number of the arcs between the variables at minimum in order to keep the model structure reasonable simple and easy to understand.
The achieved model can be adapted also to other countries. The designed BN structure can be used as such including the variables and their dependences with other variables. The difference lies in the CPTs and marginal probabilities; each country has their own marginal probabilities for triggers, controllers and own CPTs, which need to be analyzed with the available data and expert opinions.
The following actions can be summarized as a proposal for the Finnish PSS mobile operator: 1) Real-time traffic monitoring control is a profitable investment to cover the whole network; that is also the only modelled control which can be used against the Sabotage and Cyber Attack triggers; 2) additional control has to be implemented for Sabotage and Cyber Attack triggers (discovered e.g. from a cyber attack defence plan), because with existing controls only 50% availability can be achieved in cases those triggers will materialized; 3) Aggregates and Duplicated Links are, along with Real-time traffic monitoring, the only controls which really improve the availability; they decrease the Service Risk in highly populated areas; 4) the implementation of a PSS mobile network based on the commercial mobile network -which doesn't have priority functionality -means that the network is unavailable during Misuse of Network and Exceptional emergency cases, i.e. the network is useless during the precise cases that the network was built to guard against.
